Background. Vulnerability-stress models postulate that social stress triggers psychotic episodes in vulnerable individuals. However, experimental evidence for the proposed causal pathway is scarce and the translating mechanisms are insufficiently understood. The study assessed the impact of social exclusion on paranoid beliefs in a quasi-experimental design and investigated the role of emotion regulation (ER) as a vulnerability indicator and emotional responses as a putative translating mechanism. Methods. Participants fulfilling criteria for clinical high risk of psychosis (CHR, n = 25), controls with anxiety disorders (AC, n = 40), and healthy controls (HC, n = 40) were assessed for dysfunctional (eg, rumination, catastrophizing, blaming) and functional ER-strategies (eg, reappraising, accepting, refocusing). They were then exposed to social exclusion during a virtual ball game (Cyberball) and assessed for changes in self-reported emotions and paranoid beliefs. Results. The CHR sample showed a significantly stronger increase in paranoid beliefs from before to after the social exclusion than both control groups. This was accounted for by lower levels of functional and higher levels of dysfunctional ER (compared to HC) and by a stronger increase in self-reported negative emotion in the CHR group (compared to AC and HC). Conclusions. The results confirm the role of negative emotion on the pathway from social stressors to psychotic symptoms and indicate that both the use of dysfunctional ER strategies and difficulties in employing functional strategies add to explaining why people at risk of psychosis respond to a social stressor with increased paranoia.
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Key words: paranoia/delusions/social stress/social exclusion/vulnerability Studies with varying designs carried out in different contexts have repeatedly shown migration, 1 the experience of being bullied in childhood, 2 discrimination, 3 low socio-economic status, 4 small social networks, 5 hearing impairment, 6 belonging to a sexual minority, 7 and exposure to high levels of criticism 8 to be risk factors for psychosis. A common ingredient of these factors is the likely experience of social exclusion indicating that this could be a crucial component of the risk. 9, 10 Although it is assumed that social exclusion is not a mere consequence of the disorder but also precedes it, 11 the question of causality is far from understood and requires experimental studies that test for the effect of social exclusion under controlled conditions.
If experiences of social exclusion add to the emergence of symptoms, one question this raises is in whom and how these experiences translate into symptoms. Cognitive variants of vulnerability-stress models offer a helpful framework in this regard, postulating that the way vulnerable individuals interpret experiences is relevant to symptom formation and that the type of interpretation is strongly influenced by the dominant affective state. 12, 13 These models thus ascribe a key role to negative emotion as a translating mechanism from stressors to psychotic symptoms in general, and particularly to delusions.
Overwhelming support for the role of negative emotion as a translating mechanism stems from research that has focused on the temporal mechanisms of symptom formation under stress. Researchers using an experience sampling method (ESM) found daily stressors to go along with a higher increase in negative emotion in patients with psychosis relative to controls 14 whereby the increase in negative emotion preceded the increase in symptoms. 15 In accord with vulnerability-stress models, the heightened emotional sensitivity to stress is also found in people classified as high risk for psychosis. 16, 17 These findings are corroborated by studies that induced stress in the laboratory. [18] [19] [20] For example, Kesting et al 18 found social exclusion to trigger an increase in paranoid beliefs, which was mediated by an increase in negative emotion and moderated by psychosis proneness.
Thus, existing research indicates that emotions act as a translating factor between psychosocial stressors and psychotic symptoms in vulnerable individuals. This raises the question of why those at risk have difficulties in dealing with emotions in an adaptive manner. Employing strategies to steer emotions in the desired direction is generally referred to as emotion regulation (ER) 21 and has been found to be crucial to mental well-being. For example, accepting or reappraising a situation or using problem solving have been found to be related to lower symptom levels across various mental disorders, including anxiety disorders and depression, 22, 23 which is why these strategies are generally referred to as functional strategies. In contrast, suppressing or avoiding emotions or ruminating, catastrophizing and blaming oneself or others is related to psychopathology and considered as dysfunctional. 24 Compared to HC, people with psychosis tend to use fewer functional and more dysfunctional strategies. 25 As with the affective reactivity, the difficulties in ER are already detectable in high-risk samples, who have been found to use less reappraisal in daily life 26, 27 and to be characterized by lower emotion awareness and more suppression of emotions. 26, 28 Within both patient and nonclinical samples the difficulties in ER are associated with various psychotic symptoms. [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] Taken together, there is compelling evidence for heightened emotional reactivity and for difficulties in ER both in people with psychosis and in those at risk. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that difficulties in ER constitute a vulnerability marker that explains the affective response to social stressors and thereby the increase in symptoms in response to stressors.
In the present study, we used an established virtual ball (Cyberball) paradigm 34 to investigate the responses to the experience of social exclusion in a sample of individuals at clinical high risk of psychosis (CHR) compared to a healthy control (HC) group. To establish that the responses to social exclusion are unique to CHR rather than part of other psychopathology we included a sample of patients with anxiety disorders as an additional control group (anxiety controls [AC]). We chose a single symptom approach, investigating persecutory delusions, because the link between negative emotions and persecutory delusions is the one most reliably established across a variety of research designs. 20, 35, 36 Based on the findings outlined above, we hypothesized that the CHR group would show a stronger increase in paranoid beliefs following a social exclusion induction than the control groups (HC, AC). We then explored the mechanisms of this effect by testing whether baseline group differences in ER (ie, fewer functional and more dysfunctional ER strategies in the CHR group) explain the group differences in paranoid responses (stronger response in the CHR group) via the affective response to the exclusion (more negative affective response in the CHR group).
Method

Recruiting Procedure and Inclusion Criteria
CHR participants were recruited from the early detection and intervention center and the department of adolescent psychiatry of the University Medical Centre Hamburg-Eppendorf. HC and AC (and 6 CHR participants) were recruited via advertisements in local newspapers. Inclusion criteria were sufficient command of the German language and age between 18 and 65 years. Furthermore, CHR were required to have fulfilled the criteria for prodromal syndromes as defined in the "Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes" (SIPS). 37 Exclusion criteria were present or past psychotic disorder, current substance dependence and major neurological disorders. HC were to have no clinically relevant present Axis I disorder, no disorder that required treatment in the past, no psychotic disorder in a first-degree relative and were not to be taking medication for any type of mental problem.
Participants
All CHR (n = 25) fulfilled criteria for at least 1 of 3 prodromal syndromes. The majority fulfilled the SIPS 37 criteria for the "Attenuated Positive Symptom syndrome" (76%), 2 participants met the criteria for the "Genetic Risk and Deterioration syndrome" (8%), and 4 participants fulfilled criteria for both of these syndromes (16%). No participant fulfilled criteria for the "Brief Intermittent Psychotic Symptom syndrome." Moreover, all CHR participants fulfilled the criteria for at least one comorbid diagnosis according to the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.) 38 which were affective disorders (n = 24), anxiety disorders (n = 9), obsessive compulsive disorder (n = 2), post traumatic stress disorder (n = 4), substance related disorders (n = 2), and bulimia nervosa (n = 2). Thirteen participants were taking any kind of psychotropic medication, 4 were taking antipsychotics.
The AC (n = 40) fulfilled criteria for at least one anxiety disorder in the M.I.N.I. All but one fulfilled criteria for more than one disorder. Diagnoses included panic disorder/agoraphobia (n = 30), social anxiety (n = 13), and generalized anxiety disorder (n = 10). Moreover, 19 fulfilled criteria for current affective disorder (13 major depression, 6 dysthymia), 23 for past affective disorder (17 major depression, 6 bipolar disorder), 5 for post-traumatic stress-disorder, 3 for substance abuse, and 1 for Bulimia nervosa. The HC comprised 40 participants. Demographic and clinical information for each group are provided in table 1.
Design and Procedure
The experiment was conducted as a repeated-measures design with 3 groups comparing the differences in the response to a social exclusion paradigm between CHR and HC. The CHR participants were prescreened for inclusion criteria by phone using the Early Recognition Inventory Checklist 41 and potential AC and HC participants were prescreened for Axis-I disorder. Eligible participants were invited to a more detailed assessment of the inclusion criteria, sociodemographic data, paranoid ideation, and ER. Before participation, they provided informed consent.
On a separate assessment day, the social exclusion induction was conducted within a series of experimental paradigms within a larger project on ER. Negative emotion and paranoid beliefs were assessed before and after the social exclusion induction. Finally, the participants were fully debriefed. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the German Psychological Society. All participants were paid for participation.
Social Exclusion Induction
We induced social exclusion using Cyberball, 34 a well-established social exclusion paradigm in which the participants throw a ball to or catch a ball from 2 virtual players. The paradigm was compiled with Presentation software (version 16, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). Participants were told that they would be playing the game via the internet with real players from the neighboring rooms. After the preassessment of negative emotion and paranoid beliefs, the examiner left the lab for 1 min under the pretext of looking at the supposed other participants. Following this, a simulation of a log in process including the names of the supposed 2 other players started and then the game begun. Participants were excluded by receiving the ball only twice from the other players at the beginning of the game and then no more for the rest of the game that lasted for about 60 s and included 24 ball throws. After the Cyberball game the participants were asked to indicate how much they agree with the statement "I feel excluded, rejected, like an outsider" (at the moment) on an 11-point rating scale ranging from 1 (not applicable) to 11 (fully applicable).
Measures
Psychopathology To verify the inclusion criteria in the CHR sample we used the SIPS, which encompasses an assessment of schizotypal personality disorder according to DSM-IV, family history, and global functioning (GAF). Moreover, it includes the "Scale of Prodromal Syndromes" (SOPS) which contains 4 subscales for 40 ; SOPS, "Scale of Prodromal Syndromes." The score of the positive subscale reflects the mean sum score of the 5 SOPS items unusual thought content/delusions, suspiciousness/persecutory ideas, grandiosity, perceptual abnormalities/hallucinations, and disorganized communication, scored 0-6. a Significant increases from pre to post. *P < .05, **P < .01, ***P < .001 (2-tailed).
positive, negative, disorganization, and general symptoms constructs (in this study, however, the subscales negative, disorganization, and general symptoms were not assessed because they are not necessary to verify the prodromal status). The SIPS includes operational definitions of the 3 prodromal syndromes, which are applied to the information derived from the positive subscale of the SOPS, the schizotypal personality disorder checklist, the family history, and the GAF. To rate the SIPS, 2 assessors were trained by an expert specialized in the assessment of at risk mental states. The first 5 cases were rated by both assessors and discussed until a consensus was reached. All following cases were rated by one assessor but discussed with the other assessor to ensure a comparable procedure. Previous research has shown excellent interrater reliability of the SIPS post-training. SIPS defined CHR syndromes have been shown to be associated with an increased risk of schizophrenia in several studies. 37, 42 Specifically, a large multicenter longitudinal study found CHR syndromes to predict the development of psychosis in 35% of the 291 participants over a 2-year period. 43 The diagnostic criteria of Axis I disorders were assessed in both samples with the M.I.N.I. 38 for DSM-IV and ICD-10 by 3 psychologists trained for the purpose.
Emotion Regulation The German version of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) 40 was used to assess baseline ER. The CERQ consists of 27 statements, rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). It comprises 9 dimensions of cognitive ER that can be grouped into functional (positive reappraisal, positive refocusing, acceptance, refocusing on planning, putting into perspective) and dysfunctional strategies (catastrophizing, self-blame, rumination, blaming others). In previous research, internal consistencies (Cronbachs alpha) for the German version of the CERQ subscales lay within an acceptable range (.60-.86). In our sample, internal consistency was good for functional (.89) and dysfunctional ER (.86) subscales, and internal consistencies for strategy-specific subscales were acceptable to good (.75-.87).
Paranoid Beliefs
The frequency subscale of the German version of the Paranoia Checklist 44, 45 was used to assess baseline paranoid ideation in both groups. The Paranoia Checklist is an 18-item self-report scale assessing ideas of persecution and reference with excellent internal consistency and good convergent validity in both clinical and nonclinical samples. 44, 45 To assess the increase in state paranoia from before to after the social exclusion, we used 7 state adapted self-report items (eg, "There is a possibility of a conspiracy against me," "Someone I don't know has bad intentions towards me") from the Paranoia Checklist that had proven to be sensitive to change in a pre-post measurement in previous studies. 46 The participants were asked to indicate how much they agree with the statements "at the moment" on an 11-point rating scale. In our sample, internal consistency was excellent for the 18-item Paranoia Checklist (.94) and good for the state adapted version (.89).
Negative Emotion Participants were asked to perform intensity ratings of state emotions using well-validated 11-point rating scales (1 = "not applicable," 11 = "applicable"). 47 The scales were labeled by 4 descriptive adjectives and were selected to capture expected emotions such as shame (embarrassed/ridiculed/ashamed/foolish), fear (frightened/timid/afraid/scared), sadness (sad/depressed/ miserable/dejected), and anger (angry/annoyed/mad/ sore). The items showed acceptable internal consistency (.77), so the mean score served as an index of "negative emotion."
Statistical Analyses
We used the lavaan package for R 48 to test the mediation model, all other analyses were conducted with SPSS Statistics 22. To test the first hypothesis that the CHR group would show a stronger increase in paranoid beliefs following social exclusion than the control groups, we used repeated-measures ANOVAs with time (paranoia: pre, post assessment) as within subject factor and group (CHR vs AC vs HC) as between subject factor.
To test the second hypothesis that the effect of group on the increase in paranoid beliefs will be accounted for by lower functional and higher dysfunctional ER strategies and by a stronger increase in negative emotion, we calculated change scores (Δ) for negative emotion and paranoid beliefs. Δ was defined as the difference between the pre-and post-test scores of the respective variable. Positive Δ indicates an increase from pretest to post-test. Change scores were chosen rather than residualized change (ie, post scores controlling for prescores) because they have been discussed as the preferable method for research questions in observational studies were the predictor (ie, group) or outcomes (ie, ER, negative emotion) and pretest scores (ie, baseline paranoid beliefs) are meaningfully associated. 49 Moreover, change scores allow for more parsimonious models and are more readily interpretable.
We tested the direct and indirect effects of the independent variable group (dummy coded as 2 correlated variables that test for the difference between CHR and 1 control group, respectively: X 1 : −1 = "HC", 0 = "CHR"; X 2 : −1 = "AC", 0 = "CHR") on the dependent variable (Y = Δ paranoid beliefs), while modeling a process in which X 1 /X 2 affects a mediator (M 1 = cognitive ER) which in turn affects another mediator (M 2 = Δ negative emotion), and both M 1 and M 2 affect Y. We used a bootstrapping approach, a nonparametric resampling procedure advocated for testing mediation, because it does not impose the assumption of normality of the sampling distribution and can be applied to small samples with more confidence than other methods. [50] [51] [52] Given the 2 indicators for ER (the functional and dysfunctional ER subscale) 2 serial multiple mediator models were tested. The first model tested the effects of X (group: CHR vs AC vs HC) on Y (increase in paranoid beliefs) with functional ER as M 1 and the increase in negative self-reported emotion as M 2 . The second was analogous but included dysfunctional ER as M 1 . For each model, the total indirect effect (a 1 b 1 + a 2 b 2 + a 1 db 2 ) , the 3 specific indirect effects (via ER only: a 1 b 1 , via Δ negative emotion only: a 2 b 2 and via ER and Δ negative emotion: a 1 db 2 ) and the direct effect (c′) are reported. In both models, mediation for the group comparisons CHR vs HC (X 1 ) and CHR vs AC (X 2 ) on Δ paranoid beliefs were tested. Similar mediation pathways for both group comparisons indicate a functional mechanism specific to CHR, whereas mediation pathways limited to the CHR vs HC comparison indicate a general psychopathological mechanism. Ten thousand bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals were used for all analyses.
Results
Baseline Differences and Manipulation Check
Means and standard deviations for all study variables per group are depicted in table 1. A depiction of each of the CERQ subscales per group and the intercorrelations of the variables of interest can be found in the supplementary table 1 and 2. At baseline, there were significant differences between groups regarding functional and dysfunctional ER, negative emotion and paranoia (both frequency of paranoid thoughts and state paranoia). With the exception of baseline state paranoia (AC: skewness = 2.2, kurtosis = 5.6; HC: skewness = 3.0, kurtosis = 8.7) in HC and AC and baseline negative emotion (skewness = 2.2) in the HC, all variables reported (including the change scores used for the mediation analyses) were in the range considered acceptable in terms of distribution, ie, skewness γ 1 < 2 and kurtosis γ 2 < 7. 53 The mean values for the subjective exclusion ratings indicated that there was at least a moderate feeling of exclusion after participation in the Cyberball game (M = 5.58; SD = 3.52). Repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect for time on negative emotion [F(1, 102) = 45.99, P < .001, η 2 partial = .311] indicating that the negative emotion was more pronounced after the exclusion. Moreover, subjective feelings of exclusion were significantly correlated with Δ negative emotion [r(103) = .526, P < .001], which indicates that the paradigm had the intended effect.
The Effect of Group on the Increase in Paranoid Beliefs
Repeated-measures ANOVA with time (paranoia: pre, post assessment) as within subject factor and group (CHR vs AC vs HC) as between subject factor revealed a significant main effect for time [F(1, 102) = 37.12, P < .001, η partial 2 = .267] and a significant time × group interaction [F(2, 102) = 3.60, P = .031, η partial 2 = .066], which is depicted in figure 1 , group-wise tests of pre to post differences showed all groups to report significantly more paranoid beliefs following the Cyberball game (table  1) . Further post hoc tests showed that the CHR group reported significantly more paranoid beliefs at pre and post assessment than the AC and HC (all P Bonferroni corrected < .001), whereas no difference was found between AC and HC at pre (P Bonferroni corrected = .050) or post assessment (P Bonferroni corrected = .468). 
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Test of Models
As can be seen in figure 2 (model 1) , the sum of all indirect associations involving functional ER and Δ negative emotion was significant for both between group differences in Δ paranoid beliefs (CHR vs HC and CHR vs AC) and fully mediated the formerly significant associations between groups and Δ paranoid beliefs (c 1 , ′ c 1 and c 2 , ′ c 2 , figure  2 ). An analysis of the individual mediating paths revealed that increased Δ paranoid beliefs in the CHR compared to the HC group (X 1 ) was mediated by 2 separate indirect associations: One significant path via functional ER (X 1 → M 1 → Y) and a second path via Δ negative emotion (X 1 → M 2 → Y). By comparison, the difference in Δ paranoid beliefs between the CHR and AC group (X 2 ) was only significantly mediated by Δ negative emotion (X 2 → M 2 → Y). There was no difference in functional ER between the CHR and AC group, rendering the indirect path via functional ER non-significant (
Moreover, the sum of all indirect associations between groups (ie, CHR vs HC and CHR vs AC) and Δ paranoid Fig. 2 . Total effect of group (2 dummy-coded variables, X 1 : −1 = "healthy controls", 0 = "clinical high risk (CHR)"; X 2 : −1 = "anxiety controls", 0 = "CHR") on the increase in paranoid beliefs and mediation analyses of this effect via functional emotion regulation and the increase in negative emotion. Note: Unstandardized coefficients. Significant effects printed in bold. + P < .10, *P < .05, **P < .01, ***P < .001 (2-tailed).
beliefs via dysfunctional ER and negative emotion was significant ( figure 3 ) and the association between group and Δ paranoid beliefs was no longer significant after taking the mediators into account (c 1 and c 2 , figure 2 ; ′ c 1 and ′ c 2 , figure 3) . Again, the specific indirect associations via dysfunctional ER (X 1 → M 1 → Y) and the specific indirect association via Δ negative emotion (X 1 → M 2 → Y) significantly mediated the increased Δ paranoid beliefs in the CHR compared to the HC group (X 1 ). In contrast, only Δ negative emotion (X 2 → M 2 → Y) mediated increased Δ paranoid beliefs in the CHR compared to the AC group (X 2 ).
However, neither the functional ER-model (figure 2) nor the dysfunctional ER-model (figure 3) yielded any significant indirect association through both ER and Δ negative emotion sequentially (
with no significant link between functional/dysfunctional ER (M 1 ) and Δ negative emotion (M 2 ).
Finally, the AC and HC group showed no significant difference in Δ paranoid beliefs (total effect: c = −0.082, SE = 0.296, t = −0.277, P = .782, 95% CI = [−0.672, 0.508]), so no mediation model was calculated for this group comparison.
Additional Analyses
Due to the trend-level effect for the difference in formal school education between the groups and the nonsignificant but numeric difference in age, we aimed to control for potential third variable explanations. We thus repeated all mediation analyses with a subsample of all 3 groups matched (n = 25, respectively) for formal school education, age, and gender. Mediation analyses yielded essentially the same results regarding significant direct and indirect effects for the functional ER mediation model. For the dysfunctional ER mediation model, however, the individual mediation paths via dysfunctional ER and the mediation via Δ negative emotion for the HC (but not the AC) group became nonsignificant (see supplementary table 3 for details).
To understand how much of the effect of dysfunctional ER is driven by "blaming others" (a strategy reflecting mechanisms associated with paranoia) and "self-blaming" (a strategy reflecting mechanisms associated with depression), we recalculated model 2 using the CERQ dysfunctional subscale without the "other blaming" or "self-blaming" subscale, respectively. The mediation path for the group comparison HC vs CHR via ER became Fig. 3 . Total effect of group (2 dummy-coded variables, X 1 : −1 = "healthy controls", 0 = "clinical high risk (CHR)"; X 2 : −1 = "anxiety controls", 0 = "CHR") on the increase in paranoid beliefs and mediation analyses of this effect via dysfunctional emotion regulation and the increase in negative emotion. Note: Unstandardized coefficients. Significant effects printed in bold. + P < .10, *P < .05, **P < .01, ***P < .001 (2-tailed). 
Discussion
The aim of the study was to test whether social exclusion triggers an increase in paranoia in vulnerable individuals and to gain a better understanding of the translating mechanisms. As expected, the CHR group showed a stronger increase in paranoia following the social exclusion than both control groups. By using a standardized stressor, we can infer that the associations between social stressors and symptoms found in experience sampling and cross-sectional studies 14, 15 are not merely explicable by differences in the type or intensity of stressors people are exposed to but indeed by the differences in the way they respond to these stressors. Moreover, we found that the stronger paranoid response in the CHR group was accounted for by this group's stronger emotional response compared to the controls, which supports the increasingly well-established role of negative emotion on the pathway from stressors to symptoms. As the ACs were characterized by high rates of comorbid depression and other disorders, but nevertheless did not show a noteworthy increase in paranoia, we conclude that the responses to social exclusion are likely to be unique to the development of paranoia in people at risk of psychosis and do not just describe a general psychopathology mechanism. It needs noting though that our design does not allow us to rule out the possibility that paranoid beliefs arise first and are followed by negative emotion or that negative emotion and beliefs drive each other. Only few longitudinal studies have tested for both potential causal directions and-in line with our assumptions-these support the notion that negative emotion precedes rather than follows positive symptoms. 54, 55 An important contribution of our study is in demonstrating a relevant role of ER in this process. As expected, we found both the CHR and the AC to report significantly fewer functional and significantly more dysfunctional strategies. Moreover, we could show that these habitual difficulties explained why the CHR sample showed a stronger increase in paranoid beliefs than the HC following the exclusion. The relevance of functional ER to the increases of paranoia fits into findings from a neuroimaging study, 56 which showed exclusion in Cyberball to activate the medial prefrontal cortex in controls but not in patients with schizophrenia. Moreover, the blunted medial prefrontal cortex responses correlated with increased severity of positive symptoms. Together, the findings corroborate our notion that symptoms arise from difficulties to actively downregulate negative emotion using functional strategies. The relevance of dysfunctional ER strategies for increases in paranoia was less clear. Firstly, the mediation effect via dysfunctional ER did not hold up in the additional analysis with matched samples. Secondly, differential analyses of the impact of dysfunctional ER indicated that this effect was driven by the strategies of "blaming others" and "self-blaming." The latter corresponds with a previous study using the CERQ 40 in a subclinical sample that found self-blaming to be the most relevant ER strategy predicting increased paranoia over time. 33 Although ER and negative emotion both added to explaining the stronger increase in paranoia in the CHR group, the more complex model postulating that ER would exert its influence on paranoia by explaining the variance in the emotional response was not confirmed. In regard to the indirect effect via functional ER and negative emotions there was a trend effect in the expected direction for CHR vs HC, which might have gained full significance given a higher power of the study. Inspection of the path coefficients indicated that functional ER was more likely to exert its influence via increased negative emotion than dysfunctional ER, which showed a stronger direct link to paranoid beliefs. This pattern of findings has high face validity and should be further pursued in larger samples, preferably using a design that assesses the use of ER strategies during the stressful situation. This would also allow to investigate whether emotional responses exert their influence "back" to ER, ie, if more distress makes it more difficult to apply functional strategies.
Limits of the Generalizability of the Findings
The symptom response was limited to paranoid beliefs. To ascertain the specificity of the effects to paranoia would have required including state measures of other symptoms. Another issue is that the average age of our sample was higher than has been found for other risk samples with age spans mostly between 12 and 40 years, 57 although one large study also included patients up to the age of 50.
58 Meta-regression analyses across high risk studies indicate higher age to be moderately associated with an increased-rather than a reduced-risk of transition, 57, 59 but these analyses are based on the majority of younger samples. Thus, although there is no fixed or consensually defined age limit for being classified as CHR we know little about the risk in people above the age of 40. In regard to males, it seems intuitive that the term risk is best applied to individuals up the age of 35 and thus, within the peak incidence age range, although there is indication of a second peak around the age of 39. 60, 61 The incidence rates for women (who constitute 72% of those older than 35 in our sample), follow a flatter distribution and show no obvious decline from age 35 onwards, with some studies reporting a trimodal age of onset with a late peak at 61.5 years. 60, 61 Moreover, the study by Klosterkötter et al 60 that included CHR participants up to age 50 reported a conversion rate of 49.4% over the course of 9.6 years. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that our sample included a higher proportion of people with stable schizotypal symptoms rather than prodromal symptoms. Another issue is the trend toward lower education in our CHR sample compared to the controls, which might have affected the results (eg, in terms of finding the experimental situation more overwhelming). However, matching for age, education, and gender did not essentially affect the findings, although individual paths in the dysfunctional ER-model lost significance. Finally, some design issues need to be considered. We decided to use change score analysis for our mediation models. Although this method is suitable to our purpose, it may come with the trade-off of reduced acuity because the reliability of pre and post assessment scores is not taken into account. However, mediation analyses with paranoia and negative emotion scores post-Cyberball with prescores as control variable did not change the pattern of significant and nonsignificant results. Moreover, following the assumption that trait ER difficulties constitute a distal risk factor that increases the effect of stressors we only measured habitual ER difficulties at baseline. This design did not allow us to test for state changes in ER. Thus, we cannot rule out that a stronger increase in negative emotion temporarily decreases the capability to regulate emotions, which in turn triggers paranoid beliefs. Future research could use an experience sampling procedure to explore competing theories for the temporal mechanism underlying the increase in paranoid beliefs. Another design issue worth noting is that although we speak of responses to social exclusion, strictly speaking this is only a quasi-experimental design, as we did not compare the responses between inclusion and exclusion but only the differences from pre to post exclusion between the groups. However, as the Cyberball paradigm is well validated to induce negative emotion, 62 we argue that this design was justified for our research questions.
Discussion of Potential Mechanisms and Their Implications
Given the accumulating evidence for the relevance of social exclusion as a risk factor for psychosis and this study's finding that ER plays a relevant role in explaining how symptoms of paranoia arise in response to social exclusion, it is worthwhile to reflect on longer-term mechanisms that link social adversity, ER, emotions, and symptoms. It has repeatedly been shown that people with psychosis have a higher risk of trauma 63, 64 and linked to transition, 63 particularly if it occurs at an early age. 65 It has been suggested that previous exposures to trauma increase the sensitivity to subsequent exposures to stress, 66 a notion backed up by studies finding that nonpsychotic individuals with a history of trauma or a minority status show elevated striatal dopamine responses. [67] [68] [69] In further specification of the sensitization assumption, early experiences of maltreatment tend to compromise peoples' capacity to regulate emotions, 70 which is probably because functional ER develops through positive interaction with caregivers. 71 If a child does not experience appropriate validation of its feelings, it will be less likely to identify, tolerate, and express feelings adequately in later life. Moreover, ER is likely to be passed on to offspring via model learning. 72, 73 Accordingly, both children and adult victims of abuse display fewer adaptive ER skills compared to those without abuse. 70, 74 Our findings show that this is associated with stronger emotional responses that fuel symptoms. However, although the postulated mechanisms from social stressors to symptoms via emotion were largely backed up by this study, they did not explain the total variance in the symptom responses, indicating that other mechanisms are also relevant. For example, the neural diathesis stress model postulates an abnormal stress regulation via the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis that might lead to overactivation of dopamine pathways. 75 The precise biological mechanisms linking social stressors to symptoms are subject to ongoing research 76 and models on how biological mechanisms might interact with ER 77 in triggering psychotic symptoms are only just beginning to emerge.
As social stressors cannot be entirely avoided targeting the mechanisms linking stressors to psychopathology may be worthwhile. The specific approach most clearly backed up by this study is to focus on helping individuals at risk to increase and optimize the use of functional ER strategies. This could be done by adapting existing ER interventions 78, 79 to the target group. Whether this approach has a preventive effect is an issue for future research.
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